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PREVENTING THE BIRTH OF DRUG-ADDICTED BABIES
THROUGH CONTRACT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
C.R.A.C.K. ORGANIZATION
Barbara Harris, a California homemaker, was angry at a
system that failed to prevent children from being born with illegal
drugs in their systems. In her own words:
I became a foster parent in 1990 and the first little girl that was
placed with me was eight months old. [I] found out that she was
the fifth baby born to the same drug-addicted mother. Four
months after Destiny [the foster child] came to us, we got a
phone call from the social worker who told us that Destiny had
a baby brother. So [I] went ahead and took him too, so they
could be together-the older four were in four different
homes .... At this point, I was angry because the mother had
given birth to six addicted babies and was allowed to just visit
her local hospital, yearly, and drop off her damaged babies and
nobody even gave her a slap on the hand. I just didn't get it.'
Harris not only got angry, she got involved. "I started calling
district attorneys' offices and police departments, asking whether
there was anything I could do as a concerned citizen, perhaps make
a citizens' arrest. I got nowhere. I was told there was nothing I
could do."2
Frustrated by these answers, and believing that the state, by
continuing to allow the births of drug addicted children, was
condoning child abuse,3 Harris started a campaign to effect legal
change.4 Harris attracted the attention of Assemblyman Phil
Hawkins, who agreed to sponsor legislation making it a crime to
give birth to a drug-addicted child in California.'

1. Interview by Jeff Stryker with Barbara Harris, Founder, Children Requiring a Caring
Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K), The Two HundredDollarSolution: Sterilizing Crack Moms, CAL.
HEALTHLINE FEATURES, at httpJ/www.chf.org/features/archive980504.html (posted May 4,

1998) [hereinafter The Two Hundred DollarSolution] (copy on file with author). Seegenerally
Anne-Marie O'Neill & Kelly Carter, DesperateMeasure, BarbaraHarrisOffers $200 to Stop
Crack Addicts from Having More Babies, PEOPLE, Sept. 27, 1999, at 145 (reporting on the
controversy surrounding the C.R.A.C.K. program). Harris and her husband eventually
adopted the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth children of the same drug-addicted woman. The
Two Hundred DollarSolution, supra.
2. The Two HundredDollar Solution, supra note 1.
3. ONeill & Carter, supra note 1, at 149.
4. Id.; The Two HundredDollarSolution, supra note 1.
5. The Two HundredDollarSolution, supra note 1.
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The Prenatal Neglect Act proposed creating the crime of
prenatal child neglect.6 A person who "knowingly uses a specified
controlled substance at a time when the person knows or reasonably
should know that she is pregnant and the use of that controlled
substance results in the child with whom the woman is pregnant
being drug-exposed at birth " 7 is guilty of prenatal child neglect.
Depending upon whether the exposure to drugs resulted in serious
physical harm to the child, the proposed crime would be punishable
either as a misdemeanor or felony.8 The Prenatal Neglect Act was
defeated on November 30, 1996.'
The California legislature's lack of support, however, did not
stop Harris. After the demise of the Prenatal Neglect Act, she
turned her attention from the public arena to the private sector. "I
knew at that point that if there was anything I wanted to do as far
as getting these women on birth control, I would have to do it on my
own because the politicians and the government don't want
anything to do with that kind of legislation."'
Harris shifted her focus from punishing drug-addicted mothers
to preventing the births of drug-addicted babies." To this end, she
founded Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K.).' 2
6. H.B. AB 2614, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), available at httpJ/www.leginfo.ca.
gov/puh/95-96/bil/asn/ab..2601-2650ab..2614_bill_960221_introduced.html. Duringthe same
legislative session, Assemblyman Brett Granlund introduced a proposed revision to
California's child neglect laws, which failed in committee. See also H.B. AB 3200, 1995-96
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), available at http'//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab3200/ab_3200bill_960223introduced.htm (proposinglegislation aimed at removing children
from the custody of substance abusing parents by mandating that all hospitals screen and
report drug-exposed infants to social services as a condition of licensing).
7. H.B. AB 2614.
8. Id. § 1. Interestingly, the defendant would be eligible for probation regardless of
whether she was a first or repeat offender, subject to the following conditions:
(A) Participation in, and successful completion of, a drug treatment program and
after-care program designated by the probation officer, including, but not limited
to, any program consistent with the intent of this chapter....
(B) Participation in a contraceptive program designated by the probation officer
(C) Drug and alcohol testing ....[The defendant shall be required to provide
her probation officer with a sample of her blood, breath, or urine whenever
requested.., except if the defendant becomes pregnant during the period of
probation, in which case the defendant shall provide her probation officer with
a sample of her blood, breath, or urine at least once a month while she remains
pregnant.
Id.
9. H.B. AB 2614.
10. The Two HundredDollar Solution, supra note 1.
11. O'Neill & Carter, supra note 1, at 146.
12. Margot Hornblower, Benevolent Bribery-OrRacism? A CaliforniaMom Stirs Debate
by PayingDrug Users to Stop Having Kids, TIME, Aug. 23, 1999, at 47.
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C.R.A.C.K is a non-profit organization that pays drug addicts for
undergoing sterilization or receiving long-term birth control.' 3
C.R.A.C.K.'s objective is "to offer effective preventive measures
to reduce the tragedy of numerous drug affected pregnancies."" Its
mission statement is succinct:
"C.R.A.C.K. offers $200 to
individuals who participate in long-term or permanent birth
control." "5 This offer is open to anyone addicted to drugs.16
Critics dismiss the loftiness of C.R.A.C.K.'s mission statement,
claiming that C.R.A.C.K. is merely bribing drug addicts with the
money they need to feed their drug addiction. 7 Others fear that the
program targets poor minorities' or is indicative of a return to
eugenics. 9 Although the C.R.A.C.K. program is voluntary, many
critics consider it a return to forced sterilization:
To critics, Harris' activities amount to eugenics: bribing
befuddled women to give up their reproductive rights. "Two
hundred dollars could lead these women to make a decision they
13. Id.

14. Objective, C.R.A.C.K., at http'//www.cracksterilization.com/objectives/ (last modified
Sept. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Objective].
15. Homepage, C.R.A.C.K., at http//www.cracksterilization.com (last modified Sept. 20,
2000) [hereinafter Homepage].
16. Id.
17. See Lisa Donovan & Sue Ellen Christian, Program Hopes to Sell Addicts on Birth
Control; $200 for Proofof Sterilization,CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1999, at 1, availableat LEXIS,
News Library, Major Newspapers File. "'Coercing women into sterilization by exploiting the
condition of their addiction is just plain wrong,' said Steve Trombley, president and CEO of
Planned Parenthood, Chicago Area. 'You are essentially bribing women with what will be
used to buy drugs. You are supporting their behavior.'" Id.
18. Robert Ourlian, Woman Offers Payment if Addicts Get Sterilization, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1997, at A3.
"The history of sterilization is so fraught with controversy and abuse that when
you offer poor, drug-addicted people $200, it looks like they're being bribed," said
Arthur Caplan, director of the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics.
Caplan said the plan will be seen as "exploitative" and even "genocidal" because
most of those eligible will be poor and minorities.
Id; see Salim Muwakkil, Cracked Logic, THESE TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at 14, LEXIS, News
Library, Major Newspapers File ("Critics also have noted that the acronym CRACK [sic]
alludes to a drug publicly associated with minorities, and thus signals Harris' racist intent,
hinting at limiting growth of those dreaded minorities."); see, e.g., Meredith May, New Twist
in Birth-Control Campaign, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1999, at A19, availableat LEXIS, News
Library, Major Newspapers File ("'I resent [Harris] coming here and putting (a billboard] up
in a black neighborhood,' said Terri Fuston ... a cosmetologist at AJ's Grooming Room in the
shadow of the Oakland [California] billboard. There is just as much of a drug problem in
other neighborhoods.").
19. See Hornblower, supranote 12, at 48; see also Michelle Cottle, Say Yes to Crack,NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1999, at 16 ("When you dangle or give $200 to somebody who's a drug
addict, it seems coercive,' says Priscilla Smith of the Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy."). For a synopsis of eugenical sterilization, see generally Sterilization and Mental
Retardation,51 A.B.A. J. 1059 (1965).
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would later regret," says Gloria Feldt, president of Planned
Parenthood Federation of America. "It is unethical because they
cannot give their informed consent."'
Although the array of issues surrounding Harris' program is
intriguing, this Note applies contract law as an alternative to
focusing on the social or constitutional aspects of C.R.A.C.K.'s
incentive program.2 The arrangement between C.R.A.C.K and
drug addicts is a contract. As such, this agreement must be
accorded deference and enforced.
C.R.A.C.K. promises to pay drug addicts $200 in exchange for
their promise to be sterilized or receive long-term birth control. This
exchange of promises can accurately be described as a contract.
Whether this contract is enforceable is the subject of this Note.
This Note explores whether a transaction between a private
organization, such as C.R.A.C.K., and a drug-addicted woman,
where cash is exchanged for sterilization or long-term birth control,
is indeed an enforceable contract. Specifically, it analyzes the
validity and enforceability of the contract and discusses the terms
and available remedies for a breach thereof. Finally, this Note
concludes with a recommendation that state governments adopt a
modified version of the C.R.A.C.K. program.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

The terms sterilization and long-term birth control are used
throughout this Note; therefore, definitions are in order. Sterilization is the surgical, permanent, birth control method. Long-term
birth control is the non-surgical alternative.
Sterilization may be achieved by either tubal ligation or
vasectomy. Tubal ligation blocks the fallopian tubes so that sperm
and an egg cannot unite.22 Vasectomy blocks the vas deferens to
prevent sperm from passing out of the testes. 23
Long-term birth control may be achieved by contraceptive
implants, hormone injections or an intrauterine device. Norplant

20. Hornblower, supra note 12, at 48; see also Cottle, supranote 19, at 17 (citing critics
who believe drug addicts are incapable of making this decision and giving informed consent).
21. While acknowledging the social and policy concerns raised by paying drug abusers to
abrogate their procreative freedom, this Note focuses on the transaction as it relates to
contract principles and does not address the constitutional or social issues.
22. ROBERT H. BLANK, FERTILITY CONTROL: NEW TECHNIQUES, NEW POLICY IssuEs 26
(1991).
23. Id. at 25.
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is the most effective reversible contraceptive available. 24 It prevents
conception for five years' and is effective within twenty-four hours
of insertion.'
Depo-Provera is the best known contraceptive
injection. It inhibits ovulation for three months;27 therefore, it must
be repeated quarterly to maintain effectiveness.' The intrauterine
device (IUD) is inserted into a woman's uterus. The IUD prevents
contraception by inhibiting sperm capacitation and survival and
preventing implantation of fertilized eggs.'
While C.R.A.C.K. specifies the methods of birth control it
considers acceptable, ° it does not provide sterilization or birth
control to its clients.31 Each of the foregoing contraception methods
requires the services of a medical provider. Federal programs
provide these services at no cost to indigent patients.32 Before
C.R.A.C.K remunerates an applicant, he/she must demonstrate
compliance with the program.
This exchange of cash for
demonstrated compliance with the program is a contract as
discussed in the next section of this Note.
THE C.R.A.C.K CONTRACT CONTAINS ALL NECESSARY ELEMENTS

Offer
C.R.A.C.K. advertises its offer via billboards in Los Angeles,
Chicago, Florida and Minnesota.'
Additionally, women in
24. Roberta J. Ogletree & Kathleen J.Welshimer, Norplant:What Health EducatorsNeed
to Know, J. HEALTH EDUC., July-Aug. 1994, at 231; see also Laura T. Hinkle, Educationand
Counseling for Norplant Users, J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC, & NEONATAL NURSING, June

1994, at 388 (discussing Norplant's effectiveness).
25. BLANK, supra note 22, at 35; Ogletree & Welshimer, supra note 24, at 230.
26. Hinkle, supra note 24, at 387; Ogletree & Welshimer, supra note 24, at 230.
27. Margaret Comerford Freda et al., Women's Responses to Depo-Provera, AM. J.
MATERNALICHILD NURSING, July-Aug. 1996, at 183-84.
28. Warren E. Leary, U.S. Approved DrugUsed by Injectionfor Birth Control,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1992, at Al.
29. Carolyn L. Westhoff, M.D., CurrentAssessment of the Use of IntrauterineDevices, J.
NURSE-MIDWFEY,.May-June 1996, at 218-19.
30. ProjectPrevention, C.R.A.C.K, at httpJv/www.cracksterilization.com/prevention/ (last
modified Sept. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Prevention] (setting forth requirements for receiving
$200); see also Cottle, supra note 19, at 17 (listing the long-term birth control methods for
which Harris' organization gives drug addicts $200).
31. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also Donovan & Christian, supra
note 17, at 1 (noting that Illinois Public Aid covers the cost of tubal ligations, vasectomies and
long-acting contraceptives); Ourlian, supra note 18 (maintaining that Medi-Cal, a state-run
health system for the poor, would pay for most sterilization operations).
32. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
33. Pam Belluck, Addicts Offered $200 to Get Sterilized, PLAIN DEALER, July 25, 1999, at
19A, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Major Papers File; see also Statistics, C.R.A.C.K., at
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Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Michigan have received money
from C.R.A.C.K. after following the program requirements outlined
on the C.R.A.C.K website.' "The billboards make an unusual offer.
'If you are addicted to drugs', they say, 'Get Birth Control - Get
$200 Cash."'
The Second Restatement of Contracts defines an offer as a
"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to the
bargain is invited and will conclude it."36 Simply put, an offer
communicates that the offeror is seeking acceptance of his/her
bargain by the offeree.
C.R.A.C.K's billboards constitute a valid offer; the offer
delineates the terms in a way that is easily understood as an
invitation for the offeree to accept. Furthermore, it is clear, definite
and leaves no room for negotiations.37
The language of the advertised offer communicates the offer in
a manner that justifies another person in understanding that
his/her assent to the bargain is invited. The words are concise and
to the point.' The language succinctly identifies to whom the offer
is made 39 -any drug-addicted person of childbearing age qualifies
as an offeree4--so a qualified reader would conclude that his/her
acceptance is invited.
The billboards also include the requirements for accepting the
offer-obtaining long-term birth control-and how to accept the
offer-by providing documentation of the completion of the
requirements to C.R.A.C.K. personnel. All of the elements of an
offer are met; therefore, the advertisements constitute a valid
1
offer.

4

httpA/www.cracksterilization.comlctbc/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Statistics] (on file with author).
34. Belluck, supra note 33.
35. Id. For a discussion of the intention behind C.R.A.C.K's offer, see Homepage, supra
note 15.
36. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981); see also Arthur L. Corbin, Offer
and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 181 (1917)
(stating that an offer is "an act whereby one person confers upon another the power to create
contractual relations between them").
37. Cf Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn.
1957) (holding that an advertisement is an offer rather than an invitation to bid when the
legal intentions of the parties is clear, definite and explicit).
38. See Belluck, supra note 33.
39. Id.
40. Prevention, supra note 30 ("The offer is open to any man or woman who is-or has
been addicted to drugs or alcohol.").
41. The billboard advertisements are not an invitation to bid. There is no room for
negotiation; if one is not a drug addict, one may not accept. If one does not receive long-term

2001]

PREVENTING THE BIRTH OF DRUG-ADDICTED BABIES

479

Further, assuming arguendo that the offer was not adequately
communicated via the billboard advertisements, C.R.A.C.K. restates
its offer when the client contacts the organization for additional
information and instruction. 2 Regardless of whether one agrees or
disagrees with the assertion that the advertisement is sufficient to
constitute an offer, a valid offer is nonetheless made at some point,
either via billboard advertisement or oral communication.
Acceptance
Acceptance of an offer is an assertion of the offeree's intention
to enter into a contract with the offeror. An acceptance must be in
The offeree's acceptance must be
response to an offer.'
communicated to the offeror."4 Finally, an offeree must accept each
term of the offer to exercise a valid acceptance.' 5
The Second Restatement of -Contracts provides that:
"[a] cceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the
offer requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by
a performance which operates as a return promise."' C.R.A.C.K's
clients accept its offer by completing what the offer requests to be
performed. As discussed above, C.R.A.C.K.'s offer is primarily
communicated via billboard advertisements. An offeree must
provide documentation of his/her drug addiction, such as an arrest
report, 4 7 and demonstrate that he/she has been sterilized or received
one of the approved long-term birth control methods to manifest
his/her acceptance."8
Once C.R.A.C.K. personnel verify the requisite drug addiction
status, they arrange for the client to sign a release form that will
allow C.R.A.C.K. workers to verify that the individual has
undergone a long-term birth-control or contraceptive procedure. 9

birth control, the offer is not open to him/her. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J.
THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS § 27 (rev. ed. 1936). The test of whether

a binding obligation may originate in advertisements addressed to the general public is
"whether the facts show that some performance was promised in positive terms in return for
something requested." Id.
42. Prevention, supra note 30.

43. HUGH COLLINs, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 154-56 (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993)
(detailing three required elements of a valid acceptance).
44. Id. at 155.
45. Id. at 154-55.
46. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (1981).
47. Belluck, supra note 33.
48. See id.
49. Donovan & Christian, supra note 17.
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"After they get the birth control procedures, usually paid for with
government assistance, they send in written proof."5°
Fulfilling the dual requirements of(1) providing documentation
of drug addiction and (2) signing a release form authorizing
verification of the birth-control or sterilization procedure manifests
assent to the terms of the offer in the manner dictated by the offer.
As illustrated, C.R.A.C.K.'s billboards constitute a valid offer and
providing the necessary documentation is manifestation of assent
or acceptance. Thus, in determining whether contract law
recognizes C.R.A.C.K. transactions, attention to consideration is
necessary.
Consideration
Offer and acceptance alone do not create a contract. 1
Consideration elevates a mere exchange of promises to the level of
a legally recognized and enforceable bargain.52 Consideration serves
both an evidentiary and cautionary function'in contract law. A
bargained for exchange is sufficient to constitute consideration."
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it
is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise
50. Belluck, supra note 33; see also Title XIX, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(10XA) (1994) (authorizing Federal Medicaid programs to reimburse states for a
percentage of the healthcare costs associated with family planning services and supplies for
low-income individuals); BLANK, supra note 22, at 62-65 (reporting on the federal
government's involvement in sterilization with an emphasis on its historically involuntary
nature).
51. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 28
(1981) ("It is a standard textbook proposition that in Anglo-American law a promise is not
binding without consideration."); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 45-47 (5th ed. 1995) (reporting that by the end of the sixteenth
century courts were imposing a requirement that the promisor must receive a benefit in
exchange for a detriment incurred by the promisee; this doctrine was later expanded to
include a promise in exchange for a promise as sufficient consideration). For a definition of
consideration as a legal formality that serves two functions, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETrED DECISIONS 45-46 (1998).
One is "evidentiary"-the function of providing trustworthy evidence of the
existence and terms of the promise in case of controversy. The other is
"cautionary"-the function of bringing home to the promisor the significance of
promising by encouraging reflection on its consequences-preventing illconsidered decisions by prompting apprehension of future fears.
Id.
52. See FRIED, supra note 51, at 29.
53. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
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and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a
legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to
the promisor or to some other person."
In Hamer v. Sidway' the New York Court of Appeals expanded
the pre-Restatement definition of consideration. To summarize the
facts of Hamer, an uncle made a promise to his nephew that he
would pay the nephew $5000 if the nephew refrained from both
smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages until he reached his
twenty-first birthday." The nephew accepted his uncle's offer and
then successfully complied with the request.5 7 The uncle died
without paying the nephew the contracted amount.' The executor
of the uncle's estate refused to pay the nephew, claiming the
promise had not been supported by adequate consideration.59
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, overruling the lower
court in favor of enforcing the contract.' The Hamer court stated
that "[consideration means not so much that one party is profiting
as that the other abandons some legal right in the present or limits
his legal freedom of action in the future as an inducement for the
promise of the first." 1 The Hamer court further noted that it was
irrelevant whether the nephew even had a desire to drink alcoholic
beverages or smoke prior to giving up their use.62 The court focused
on the sufficiency of the nephew's agreement to restrict his lawful
freedom of action without examining the extent that the
"deprivation" affected the nephew.'

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 71.
27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Forbearance ofa legal right is sufficient consideration to enforce
a promise.6 It follows that forbearance of one's constitutionally
protected freedom to procreate is valid consideration for a contract.6
In the instant transaction, the consideration is payment and
receipt of $200 in exchange for forbearance, and proof thereof, of
exercising one's reproductive rights. Forbearance of a legal right,
here restricting one's freedom to procreate via long-term
contraception or sterilization, is sufficient consideration to support
a contract between C.R.A.C.K. and a drug-addicted individual.
It may appear at first glance that the consideration the
contracting parties exchange is not of equal value. Indeed, payment
of $200 seems hardly adequate payment for one to forego one's right
to procreate. 66 However, commensurate value of benefit and
detriment is not a requirement of a bargained-for exchange.' "If
the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional
requirement of (a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or
a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or (b)
equivalence' in the values exchanged; or (c) 'mutuality of
obligation. "

Notwithstanding the apparent validity of the contract under
discussion, it is uncertain whether a court would enforce such a
contract. Not every contract merits enforcement. An unenforceable
contract appears valid on its face, but because of one party's actions
or incapacity, the court acknowledges that enforcing the contract
would be unjust.69

64. Id. at 257-258; WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 41, § 135.
65. A person (whether male or female) has a right to reproductive freedom, guaranteed
under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. "The Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy;" however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy .... " Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973). For additional Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionally
protected zone of privacy, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992)
(plurality); Carey v. PopulationServs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Eisenstadtv. Baird,405
U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).

66. The offer is not meant as payment for the value of one's procreative rights. "(The] plan
was to offer a cash incentive to drug/alcohol addicts to spark the attention of those struggling
with yearly pregnancies, numerous abortions, many abandoned children ... ." Homepage,
supra note 15.
67. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1982) ('[Mutuality'O in
the sense of requiring ...reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives other valid
consideration.") (citation omitted).
68. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).

69. II RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).

2001]

PREVENTING THE BIRTH OF DRUG-ADDICTED BABIES

483

THE C.R.A.C.K. CONTRACT IS NOT AN UNFAIR CONTRACT

Some types of contracts are so inherently unfair or one-sided
that, regardless of the fact that they have the requisite contract
elements, courts will not enforce them.7" These unfair contracts
include adhesion contracts, contracts made under coercion or undue
influence and contracts made without the informed consent of one
of the contracting parties.7 '
Adhesion Contract
"The major characteristic in this new type of contract is that the
will of one party exclusively dominates the whole transaction, not
only with regard to one individual but for the entire unidentified
group of people who will participate in such transactions."72 One
party generally has superior bargaining power. The contract is
typically a "take it or leave it" type of transaction.73
Although adhesion contracts are generally found in the context
of consumer transactions, critics of the contract between C.R.A.C.K.
and drug addicts express the belief that it is one-sided and thus, an
adhesion contract. 7 The argument that the contract under
discussion is an adhesion contract is without merit. "[Aidhesion
contracts are .

.

. contracts (or terms) that are imposed without

bargaining. The only thing the weaker party is required to do is to
'sign on the dotted line.'7 In this situation, the offeree must
complete certain conditions precedent before the contract is
completed. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, although
there is no per se "bargaining," the contract does not encompass a
consumer relationship and the weaker party is not obliged to deal
with the organization at all.76
70. See generally FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 51, ch. 4, § 4 (discussing
unconscionable contracts).
71. SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABrILITY 1 (1977).
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 126-27.
74. For a discussion of the criticisms of the C.R.A.C.K program, see Ourlian, supra note
18 ("Birth control advocates and bioethical experts... questioned the plan, saying it may
exploit poor women into giving up their right to procreate while missing the underlying cause
of babies born to drug-addicted mothers.").
75. DEUrCH, supra note 71, at 4, 126-27 (identifying disparity of bargaining power as an

essential element of every adhesion contract and clarifying that not every contract with such
a disparity is an adhesion contract).
76. Adhesion contracts generally involve preprinted form contracts to which the consumer
must agree to complete the transaction. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1.4 (rev. ed. 1993); ef Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447.48 (D.C.

Cir. 1965) (deciding that a contract for purchase of furniture on credit could be voided on basis
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The weaker party, the drug addict, is interested in receiving the
benefit of the bargain. He/she is required to do more than sign on
the dotted line. Indeed, the steps required to accept the offer are
difficult for many of C.R.A.C.K.'s clients to complete.77 For these
reasons, the contract cannot be invalidated as an adhesion contract.
Duress and Undue Influence
Harris' critics brand the transaction between C.R.A.C.K. and
drug addicts coercive and, therefore, invalid.7 8 However, coercion
may negate a party's consent to a contract only if it rises to the level
of duress or undue influence.7 9 The $200 payment is certainly more
appealing to people with few or no resources than it would be to
wealthy individuals.' The person may be influenced to accept the
contract because the value of the payment is higher to him/her than
it would be to someone for whom money is not an issue.8 '
The contract is not improperly coercive merely because the
bargain is attractive to one party due to his/her poverty. "It cannot
be acknowledged, for instance, that poverty severely constrains
choice, for this would render many common instances of contracting,
such as employment, tenancies, and purchases of food, invalid."82
Neither is the contract wrongfully coercive because of the
disparate values in the respective obligations of the parties. "[Tihe
goals to be achieved need not be common to both parties. Two
persons might agree to coordinate their behavior so as to achieve
one goal for one party and a very different goal for the other
party."' The disparity in the objective between the contracting
parties, in this case the drug addict's desire for monetary gain and
the C.R.A.C.K. organization's goal of preventing the births of
children with drug exposure, does not support a claim of wrongful
coercion."s Offering to forego procreation in exchange for a cash
of unconscionability at the time of formation).
77. See Homepage, supra note 15.
78. Cottle, supra note 19, at 17.
79. See I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.16-4.20 (2d ed. 1998).
80. See Ourlian, supra note 18.
81. See Hornblower, supra note 12, at 48; see also Cottle, supranote 19, at 18 (discussing
criticisms of C.R.A.C.K's $200 incentive, including a disproportionate effect on the poor); cf
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 769 F. Supp. 671, 739 (D. Del.
1991) (finding that, absent an improper act, driving a hard bargain did not constitute duress,
even in light of the financial distress of one of the parties).
82. COLLINS, supra note 43, at 135.
83. HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY: CONTRIBUTIONS IN LEGAL STUDIES

5 (1999).

84. FRIED, supra note 51, at 97.
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payment is a person's right. "A proposal is not coercive if it offers
what the proponent has a right to offer or not as he chooses. " '
The nephew in Hamer v. Sidway8 chose not to exercise his
lawful freedom to drink alcoholic beverage and smoke until his
twenty-first birthday in response to the financial incentive of $5000
offered to him by his uncle.87 C.R.A.C.K.'s offer of $200 is the same
type of financial incentive offered in exchange for a drug-addict
successfully foregoing procreation, one of his/her lawful actions.
The Hamer court held that the agreement to restrict or forego
activities to which one is lawfully entitled is adequate consideration
to support an enforceable bargain.' Therefore, because of the
similarities in circumstances, the C.R.A.C.K contract would also be
an enforceable bargin.
The parties are not threatened or coerced into compliance. In
fact, the process is rife with information and disclosure. 9
The process goes as follows: The participant contacts us and we
send out our paperwork. Our offer is good for 60 days after
receiving the paperwork. She or he then makes an appointment
with a personal physician or family planning provider of choice
(we are not involved in this process). In most cases, birth control
services are available at no cost, and the provider offers
informative counseling to assist their clients in choosing the
appropriate family planning method. If a participant chooses
tubal ligation, she is required by law to wait a period of 30 days
before she may undergo the procedure. After she receives her
services, she returns her completed paperwork to us. Once her
paperwork is verified by our staff, the client receives $200.90
The parties' contractual relationship is voluntary and, although
it may be encouraged by the cash incentive, it is not unduly
influenced by the promise of $200. Robert Pugsley, a professor at
Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles and an
advisor to C.R.A.C.K, agrees. "To the extent a person may be
wavering, that small amount of money may make the difference. "
85. Id.
86. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
87. Id. at 257.
88. Id.; see supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
89. See Donovan & Christian, supranote 17 ("Clients are instructed by volunteers on the
phone and in writing that this is a serious decision that must be made individually."); see also
Prevention,supra note 30 (describing in detail the process through which a person can qualify
for the $200, and supplying additional information on options and alternatives).
90. Prevention,supra note 30.
91. Ourlian, supra note 18.
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This implies that not all drug addicts of child-bearing age are
persuaded to accept C.R.A.C.K.'s offer because of the promised
payment.
Even assuming arguendo that the $200 payment is improperly
coercive because it disproportionately appeals to drug addicts, a
contract cannot be voided simply because a particular promise
induced cooperation.' The influence of the monetary inducement
does not rise to the level of wrongful coercion because it is not so
inflated that it makes a rational decision impossible. In addition,
C.R.A.C.K. provides information to prospective clients regarding the
impact of the decision to be sterilized or get long-term birth control
to ensure an informed decision.' Although the monetary incentive
may influence the decision to accept C.R.A.C.K's offer, it does not
rise to the level of improper influence.
Neither does the doctrine of duress void the C.R.A.C.K contract.
Duress requires "an illegitimate act performed by one party which
causes the other to consent to the contract."' A drug addict's
consent to C.R.A.C.K.'s offer is not achieved through threat or
undue influence by a person in a position of trust.95 Accepting the
offer is an exercise of free will. Even if influenced or motivated by
the cash reward, there is no illegitimate act that precludes the
exercise of the drug-addict's free will.9 Offering a cash incentive is
not an illegitimate act, however distasteful it may appear to
C.R.A.C.K.'s critics.97 In the absence of a threat or other illegitimate
act, C.R.A.C.K.'s contract is not voidable on the grounds of duress.
Capacity and Informed Consent
C.R.A.C.K.'s clients are drug addicts, which raises the question
of whether they have the capacity to contract. If the individual
makes his/her decision while under the influence of drugs or if the
92. MATHER, supra note 83, at 6. "Promises are sometimes made in situations where two
or more persons are to coordinate their efforts in achieving something that cannot be obtained
in the marketplace." Id. at 5.
93. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
94. COLLINS, supra note 43, at 138.
95. FARNSWORTH; supra note 79, § 4.19. Examples of special relationships in which one
person may exercise improper influence based on his/her position of trust include: parentchild, clergy-congregant and doctor-patient. Id.
96. Illegitimate acts in this context include threatened or actual physical violence, threat
of loss of employment made to employee by an at-will employer, threat of imprisonment or
criminal prosecution. See id. §§ 4.16-4.17.
97. See Cottle, supra note 19, at 17 ("[I]t's the idea of giving money to drug users that
really offends some folks' moral sensibilities. You're feeding their habit' is an oft-voiced
objection.").
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decision is galvanized by the desire for money with which to
that he/she lacked the capacity
purchase drugs, it could be argued
8
decision.
informed
an
to make
Merely being addicted to drugs is insufficient to prove
incapacity to contract." A person must be so completely intoxicated
or chronically influenced by his/her use of drugs as to be incapable
of comprehending the nature of the contract.' ° In addition, the
other party to the contract must have had reason to know that the
intoxication or drug addiction rendered the first party wholly
incapable of reasonably understanding the nature and consequences
of the contract, in which case the contract would be voidable at the
incapacitated party's option.'O
Harris disagrees with critics who suggest that C.R.A.C.K.'s
clients lack the capacity to give informed consent. "[A]ddicts can
make informed decisions about whether to receive long-term birth
control. 'They're not zombies 24 hours a day,' Harris said. 'They are
capable of making decisions and there is a 30 day waiting period
They are aware of the
before they have the procedure.
consequences.-' °
While the initial decision to accept C.R.A.C.K's offer could be
made while the client is under the influence of drugs, C.R.A.C.K.'s
process encourages deliberation. As discussed above, C.R.A.C.K.'s
clients have ample opportunity to consider the impact of their
decision during the period between their initial contact with
C.R.A.C.K. and their completion of the requirements for manifesting
98. See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TRATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 10:10 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 4th ed.'1993) (1936); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 79, § 4.6 (including the use of drugs as a cause of mental incapacity); HOWARD 0.
HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2:16 (2d rev. ed. 1999) (defining incapacity as "an

entire loss of understanding such that a party lacked the strength of mind to understand what
he or she was doing").
99. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 79, § 4.6, at 435-36; WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 98,
at § 10:11, 332.
100. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 98, § 10:11, at 335.
101. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 16 (1981).
102. Susan Dodge, Program Rewards Addicts for Taking Birth Control, CHI. SUN TIMES,

Sept. 13, 1999, at 14. C.R.A.C.K's clients have their own reasons for getting sterilized or
long-term birth control. For their testaments see Cottle, supra note 19, at 17 ("Sharon Adams
had already given birth to 14 children by the time she contacted Harris. (Four died. Nine are
in foster care. She's raising the youngest.)"); O'Neill & Carter, supra note 1, at 146-47.
Tracy McGruder, 34, felt... helpless before she received Norplant--and $200

from Harris-in September 1998. "I was out there selling my body, doing
whatever I had to do for the drug," recalls McGruder, who had five children, two
of them drug-exposed .... "I don't want to take the chance of hurting any more
kids or bringing a baby into this world and having someone else raise it," she
says. "It's just not worth it."
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acceptance. 03 It is not reasonable to infer that C.R.A.C.K's clients
lack the ability to understand the consequences of their agreed upon
contractual obligations merely because they are addicted to drugs.'
"The mere presence of such a disability.., does not itself impair the
capacity to contract." 10 5
The contract would only be voidable if C.R.A.C.K had reason to
know that the offeree was so extremely intoxicated at the time of
acceptance that he/she failed to understand the consequences of the
contract. The party has already been sterilized or received longterm birth control as a condition precedent to accepting the offer.
Therefore, he/she must necessarily have received information and
counseling about the consequences of the transaction.'l
Even if one accepts the argument that drug addiction indicates
a lack of capacity to contract, affirmative action is required to avoid
constructive ratification. 10 7 One has a reasonable amount of time
after becoming sober to repudiate the contract; failure to do so is
constructive ratification.'
Notwithstanding critics' doubts about the contract between
C.R.A.C.K. and its clients, the contract is presumed to be valid. This
presumption is rebuttable only if the client was so intoxicated that
it would be unreasonable for a C.R.A.C.KI representative to have
believed otherwise and the client disaffirms the contract within a
reasonable amount of time. 1'e
Unconscionability
The official comment to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
describes the doctrine of unconscionability as a means by which
courts may refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract."0 The
provisions of U.C.C. section 2-203 are expressly intended to prevent
oppression and avoid unconscionable results. "If the court as a
matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
103. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
104. See FARNSWORTH, supranote 79, at § 4.6, 435. But see Cottle, supra note 19, at 16-18

(addressing reports of critics' opposition to'C.R.A.C.K.'s offer); Donovan & Christian, supra
note 17 (same); Hornblower, supranote 12, at 48 (same); May, supranote 18 (same); Ourlian,
supra note 18 (same). Critics of C.R.A.C.K. uniformly believe that drug addicts are so
influenced by their addiction that they cannot make an informed decision when money, with

which they can purchase drugs, is involved.
105. FARNSWORTH, supra note 79, § 4.6, at 435.
106. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
107. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 79, § 4.7; WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 98, § 10:12.
108. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 98, § 10:12.
109. Id.
110. U.C.C. § 2-203 cmt. 1 (1978).
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been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
Although the U.C.C. governs
to enforce the contract . . ."'
commercial transactions, it can be applied by analogy to other types
of contracts.12
Whether the contract under discussion is unconscionable
depends upon the factors involved in its formation. i3 In the
C.R.A.C.I. agreement, the parties are informed as to their
respective duties and obligations. Although critics disagree, there
is little to indicate that the decision to become sterilized or receive
long-term birth control is made without adequate information.1 14 To
the contrary, because a state medical assistance program likely
covers the cost of the procedure, there are stringent controls to
ensure C.R.A.C.K's clients have adequate information and make an
informed decision with regard to the sterilization or birth control."1
Significantly, [under] the regulations on sterilization that
became effective on February 6, 1979... a waiting period of at
least 30 days is required; informed consent cannot be obtained
while the person is... under the influence of alcohol or drugs;
and complete information concerning the risks, side effects, and
irreversibility of sterilization as well as alternative methods of
contraception must be given in the patient's own language both
orally and in writing. The informed consent form must be
signed by the person seeking sterilization, the person who
obtains the consent, the physician performing the sterilization,
and an interpreter if relevant. The regulations, therefore,
provide strict guidelines for the use of federal funds and
represent an effort to ensure that only mentally competent
111. Id. § 2-203.
112. See, e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., No. 92-12731-RCI, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7815, at *12 (D. Mass. May 3, 1995) ("If the contract involves the sale of goods, the
unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.. .will apply directly, if it does
not, the same provision will apply by analogy.*). See generally Daniel E. Murray, Under the
SpreadingAnalogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447
(1971) (discussing the courts' acceptance of extending article 2 of the U.C.C. into non-sales
areas and predicting an acceleration of its acceptance into all areas of contract law).
113. Courts consider a number of factors to determine if a contract is unconscionable,
including whether the parties had a meaningful choice to enter into the contract, whether
there was any deception or concealment of terms in the fine print, whether the contract was
wholly one-sided and whether the inequality of the contract is so overwhelming that no
reasonable person would accept its terms and no fair person would offer such terms. See, e.g.,
Children's Surgical Found., Inc. v. Nat'l Data Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (N.D. 1ll.
2000); Cain P'ship, Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 91-5524, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11377,
at *13 (6th Cir. May 11, 1992); Svalina v. Split Rock Land & Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 882
(Wyo. 1991).
114. See BLANK, supra note 22, at 62-64.
115. Id.
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adults who have made an informed decision free from coercion
may be sterilized under [Medicaid, the Public Health Service, or
the Social Services Program]."'
Critics imply that the C.R.A.C.K. contract is unconscionable
because it does not include incentives for drug addicts to overcome
their addiction." 7 In particular, they feel that the emphasis should
be on drug treatment programs for pregnant women, rather than
sterilization and long-term birth control. 118 "[Tihe CRACK [sic]
program doesn't solve the problem of poor women addicted to drugs,
'The focus should be on treating women while they're pregnant and
addicted . . .. "119
With respect to the criticism that the C.R.A.C.K. program does
not address the root cause of the addicts' problem because it does
not refer drug addicts to treatment or counseling programs,
Georgann Turner, Volunteer Director of the Sacramento/Bay Area
chapter of C.R.A.C.K. responds: "Our clients have all been in
contact with social services and the criminal justice system
numerous times. They have been offered substantial services (i.e.
drug treatment, housing and parenting assistance) many times, and
have still failed to change their lives."'
Turner continued her
defense of the C.R.A.C.K. program: "The motivation of getting their
kids back (or the coercion of losing them) has not prompted a change
I doubt that the $200 does much more than get their
attention." 21
Other critics have altered their initial perceptions of C.R.A.C.K.
after learning more about its program. For example, Earl Ofari
Hutchinson led a protest of African-Americans and Latinos in front
of one of C.R.A.C.K's billboards in Los Angeles. 2 2 The next day,
123
however, he issued a retraction of the protestors' angry words.
"[Aifter discussions with CRACK [sic] founder, Barbara Harris, and
despite what many believe, we are satisfied that the program does

116. Id. at 64.

117. See Ourlian, supra note 18.
118. Donovan & Christian, supra note 17.
119. Ourlian, supra note 18 (quoting Rebecca Jurado, an Assistant Professor at Western
State College of Law in Fullerton, California).
120. E-mail from Georgann Turner, Volunteer Director, Sacramento/Bay Area Chapter of
C.R.A.C.k, to Juli Horka-Ruiz (Oct. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
121. Id.

122. What's New, C.R.A.C.K, at httpJ/www.cracksterilization.com/cfbc/whatsnew.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter What's New] (on file with author).
123. Id.
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not target African American or Latino drug users for
sterilization ..... 1
The contract between C.R.A.C.K. and its clients does not rise to
the level of unconscionability. The purpose of sterilization or birth
control in this context is to prevent the birth of drug-exposed
The lack of referral to drug treatment programs or
infants.'
counseling is not indicative of an unfair contract. C.R.A.C.K.'s
program does not target minorities, 6 nor are the participants
The parties mutually assent to a bargained-for
uninformed.'
exchange, creating a contract that is not outside of the spirit of
contract law.
The contract between C.R.A.C.K. and drug addicts is not the
result of duress or coercion.' The parties do not lack capacity to
contract and have made an informed decision to forgo their
procreative rights in exchange for a cash payment. m The contract
cannot be labeled an adhesion contract, nor is it inherently unfair
or unconscionable."s It is a valid, enforceable contract.
THE

C.R.A.C.I CONTRACT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY

Public policy dictates that the contract between C.R.A.C.K. and
drug addicts be upheld in order to protect a woman's right to
procreative freedom. The California Supreme Court considered a
contract for gestational surrogacy in Johnson v. Calvert." In
Johnson, the surrogate received compensation for her gestational
for gestating an
services and for undergoing labor in exchange
2
implanted fetus for the intended parents.1
Despite the surrogate's argument that the contract violated the
public policy prohibiting payment for consent to adoption of a child
because it was a pre-birth waiver ofparental rights,'" the California
court upheld the contract. "The parties voluntarily agreed to
participate in in vitro fertilization and related medical procedures
124. Id.
125. See Objective, supra note 14 (outlining the objectives and mission statement of
C.R.A.C.K).
126. See e.g., Statistics, supra note 33 (giving statistics of Caucasian as well as minority
participants). But see sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
127. See Homepage, supra note 15 (describing the process followed by C.R.A.C.K. and the
role of the physician in informing patients of their choices).
128. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
131. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
132. Id. at 778.
133. Id. at 783-84.
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before the child was conceived; at the time when Anna [the
surrogate] entered into the contract, therefore, she was not
vulnerable to financial inducements to part with her own expected
134
offspring.

"

Although a contract for surrogate gestation and a contract for
forbearing one's procreative rights are not factually similar, they
both concern a woman's reproductive freedom. The court in
Johnson affirmed the parties' respective right to form contracts
governing their procreative rights. By affirming the lower court's
decision, the California Supreme Court recognized that gestation of
a fetus does not automatically create parental rights for the
surrogate. 1' Rather, a woman has freedom over her reproductive
rights and can contract for what amounts to a gestational and
labor/delivery service without violating public policy.
Similarly, a woman may contract with another party to forego
her right to bear a child. Public policy supports enforcement of a
woman's exercise of her reproductive freedom. To suggest otherwise
is to advocate a return to a paternalistic time in which women
lacked control over their bodies and were unable to make informed
decisions with regard to their choice to procreate or forego
procreation. 136
The contract between C.R.A.C.K. and its clients does not violate
public policy because the decision to forego reproduction is solely the
individual's. If the contract were not upheld, it would be
tantamount to ajudge decreeing that a woman may not exercise her
right to forego reproduction. Furthermore, an individual's decision
to voluntarily forego his/her right to procreate, as consideration for
a contract, does not violate public policy.

134. Id. at 784.
135. See id. at 782 (concluding that the person who intended to procreate, bring about the
birth of a child and permanently raise the child is the natural mother under California law,
regardless of who gives birth).
136. See id. at 785.

The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate
and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that
for centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and
professional status under the law. To resurrect this view is to ...foreclose a
personal and economic choice on the part of the surrogate mother ....

Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution encompasses a woman's choice of whether to terminate a
pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the right to use
contraceptives to unmarried people); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding
that procreation is a fundamental right).
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ADOPTION OF A MODIFIED PROGRAM BY THE STATES

States have the power to enact regulations designed to promote
the health, safety and welfare of the community, provided the
means employed have a real and substantial relation to their
apparent purpose."3 The protection of children's health is within
the police power of state governments. 13S Adopting legislation
authorizing a program similar to C.R.A.C.K.'s to protect children
from prenatal drug exposure would be reasonably related to the
objective of protecting children's health. Therefore, states could
enact such legislation, providing it did not mandate sterilization or
long-term birth control as a prerequisite to state benefits.
Welfare reform proposed by many states included provisions
linking welfare benefits to family caps or mandatory birth control. 9
Other reforms proposed offering a cash incentive for welfare
recipients to receive long-term birth control."4 Regulation of the
reproductive freedom of welfare recipients is fraught with dangers
of abuse. A serious concern about mandating sterilization or birth
control of any particular group of the population is that:
Compulsion under our present social structure must inevitably
The politically powerful
degenerate into discrimination.
majority would quickly see to it that the fertility of the powerless
minority-the poor and the nonwhite-is restricted while theirs
is left alone. The rich would then go on doing just as they
. . . The poor would be forced to have fewer
please.
children . ..."'
The proposed program would not link birth control or sterilization
to welfare or public benefits. Its voluntary nature and limited
application to drug addicts of child-bearing age would not lead to the

137. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

§§ 3, 10-11 (Arno Press 1976) (1904); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE
LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 1, 166 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886);
cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaten, 413 U.S. 49, 109 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(discussing limitations of the police power); Purity Extract &Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192,
201 (1912) (describing the scope of the police power); Munn v. Illinois, 94. U.S. 113, 125 (1876)
(describing the source of the police power).

138. See sources cited supra note 137.
139. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in HistoricalPerspectiue,26 CONN. L. REV. 879,
894-95 (1994).
140. See id.
141. Richard Stiller, M.A., Compulsory Birth Control: Yes or No?, 36 SEXOLOGY No. 9, at
31 (Apr. 1970).
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discrimination that could follow involuntary or mandated
programs. 142
The program endorsed by this Note could be adopted by state
governments to curb the number of children born exposed to drugs.
States could create programs whereby a representative of a state
agency enters into a contract with drug addicts. This contract would
offer an incentive or reward for the person's decision to prevent the
birth of a child (or children) exposed prenatally to illegal substances.
The above program would be designed to protect the health and
welfare of children; therefore, the State would have the authority to
regulate its citizens in this manner. 14 The program would offer an
incentive or reward for a voluntary decision to prevent conception;
therefore, it does not violate a person's reproductive rights. The
solution is not one of obligatory sterilization or mandatory long-term
contraception for drug addicts. It would not require drug addicts to
enter drug treatment programs or counseling, although that option
should be available upon request. Nor is it designed to punish
women for having given birth to drug exposed or drug addicted
babies in the past. Its sole objective is to protect the health and
safety of children by preventing the birth of drug-exposed infants.
The contract must be in writing and should include the express
conditions of the agreement. 1" The contract must expressly state
the obligation of each party in the event of breach and the remedies
available to the non-breaching party.
The establishment of an oversight program is a foreseeable
obstacle to implementing this program. A monitoring mechanism
would ensure that the individuals choosing long-term birth control
did not have their implants removed or fail to receive their
quarterly injections prior to the expiration of the contract term. The
cost of implementing and staffing the oversight mechanism might
increase the costs of the program to an unworkable level.
Although not the focus of this Note, constitutional difficulties
with court-ordered injunction or specific performance are also
142. Furthermore, solutions to the underlying issues of poverty and/or drug addiction are
beyond the scope of this Note.
143. See Atl. Coast Line R.R.v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548,558-59 (1914) (holding that

State enforcement of a public health or safety regulation is not an unconstitutional property
taking).

144. The express conditions would include the condition precedent that the offeree must
submit proof of drug addiction and documentation of the sterilization procedure or long-term
birth control method he/she received. The performance of these express conditions is required
before any money would be paid. Failure to comply with one of the provisions would excuse
the offeror from its obligation to pay; performance of a duty is excused if the condition does
not occur.
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foreseeable."5 Courts may be reluctant to order continuation of
contraception if a woman changes her mind before the contract term
expires. 14
Despite a person's constitutional right to procreate, and
regardless of the criticisms discussed throughout this Note, public
policy favors protecting children from the harms associated with
being exposed to illegal drugs in utero. Entering into a voluntary
contract to forgo reproductive rights is an individual's right. Any
validly constructed contract between the state and a drug addict
should be upheld, and enforced with equitable remedies if
necessary. 147
AVAILABLE EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Equitable remedies are available for breach of contract when
monetary damages are unavailable or inappropriate."5 Specific
performance of a contract will only be ordered when damages afford
an inadequate remedy.
Two types of specific enforcement of obligations are available.
"The most direct form of equitable relief for breach of contract is
specific performance. By ordering the promisor to render the
promised performance, the court attempts to produce.., the same
effect as if the contract had been performed."149 The second
equitable remedy is injunctive relief. "Instead of ordering specific
performance, a court may, by injunction, direct a party to refrain
from doing a specific act. If the performance due under the contract
consists simply of forbearance, the effect of an injunction is to order
specific performance."' 0
145. Cf. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (refusing to
enforce a term of probation that prohibited defendant from becoming pregnant while
unmarried as beyond the scope of the court's discretionary power because the condition was
not related to the crime).
146. Cf ABC v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) ("For practical, policy, and

constitutional reasons, therefore, courts continue to decline to affirmatively enforce
employment contracts.").

147. Notwithstanding the public policy arguments, however, specific enforcement that
enjoins a woman from exercising her reproductive freedom could be classified as
unconscionable by critics. See sources cited supra notes 74, 80, 97, 104. If so, although a
clause in the contract provided specific performance as an agreed-upon remedy for breach, not
every court would enforce it. Cf Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (discussing practical and policy

reasons courts decline to grant specific performance of employment contracts).
148.
behind
149.
150.

See COLLINS, supra note 43, at 365-94 (describing judicial remedies and reasons
a judge's remedy selection).
III E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.5 (2d ed. 1998).
Id.
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It is conceivable that a drug addicted woman, who has
contracted to be on long-term birth control in exchange for financial
reward, would decide to have the hormonal implant removed before
the term of the contract expired. To prevent this breach of contract,
an injunction enjoining the woman from having the implant
removed prior to the expiration of the term would be appropriate, as
money damages would be inadequate to restore the non-breaching
party to his/her rightful position.
Specific enforcement in the form of an injunction is a viable
remedy because it is not overly intrusive. The judge would not
violate a woman's constitutional rights by ordering her to receive
birth control because the Norplant device is already in place. In
effect, a judge would be ordering specific performance in the form of
enforcing
the woman's promise to forbear procreation for a specific
15 1
term.

A more difficult situation is one wherein a woman breaches her
contractual obligation to complete the Depo-Provera injections. In
that situation, only a decree of specific performance with an order
mandating that the woman comply with the terms of the contract by
receiving the remaining series of injections would suffice. In the
case of a drug-addicted person, however, ensuring that she is in
compliance with such a court order is difficult at best. In the event
that she did not follow the order, there are few options to compel her
performance.1 52
A feasible alternative is to divide the incentive payment into
quarterly increments, payable upon proof that the injection was
administered. This would eliminate the need for specific
enforcement because the terms of the contract would not be fulfilled
unless the woman completed the entire course of contraceptive
treatments.
CONCLUSION

The state objective of protecting the health and safety of its
children, both born and unborn, is a compelling state interest.
Weighed against the constitutional right to. procreate, the balance
shifts in favor of protecting all children's right to be born healthy
and free from exposure to illegal drugs. In addition, since the right
to procreate is voluntarily forgone in the proposed contract, the

151. See id.
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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balance is more heavily tipped in the direction of upholding and
enforcing the proposed contract.
Depending upon the success of private organizations, like
C.R.A.C.K, future data may prove that contracting drug addicts do
not attempt to discontinue long-term birth control. If the data
reveals that some birth control methods are more likely to be
discontinued than others, a modified list of birth control options
may prevent or reduce the number of breaches of the proposed
contract. For instance, if the data shows that women fail to get
quarterly Depo-Provera injections, but do not take affirmative steps
to have Norplant removed before the term expires, the program
could be implemented with limited sterilization and birth control
options. The reward or incentive could be offered strictly for tubal
ligation, vasectomy or Norplant.
Without the specter ofimpending breach of contract, monitoring
and oversight costs would be dramatically reduced. If limiting the
terms of the contract to these three categories of sterilization and
long-term birth control is sufficient to prevent numerous breaches
of contract, the modified program would satisfy the states' interest
in protecting children's health and promoting their safety and would
be economically efficient. Thus, it should be implemented by state
governments.
JuLI HoRKA-RuIz

